April 1941 (Month 1)Start of month INTERVIEWER: General, thank you very much for joining us today. GENERAL: Thank you for giving me this opportunity to talk to you. INTERVIEWER: It's 1941. The Allies have ordered many of your divisions out of the North African theatre, weakening your position. You do hold the vital forward supply base at Tobruk, and you stationed many Australian, Indian, and British troops to protect the garrison. However, your intelligence tells you that German General Erwin Rommel has been assigned to the area. He appears to have under his control many Italian foot infantry, and also, several strong mobile Panzer divisions. What are your thoughts at this point? GENERAL: Yes, based on our intelligence, the Allies did have more powerful and mobile tanks than we do. The vast Libyan desert is open to the Germans, and they did pose a dangerous risk by outflanking us and cutting off our supply lines. Certainly, we had to defend the important forward supply base at Tobruk. I stationed the valiant Australians, British and Indian troops therre to defend that base. However, with the few remaining divisions I had available, I had to defend the vast Libyan Desert. We had control of Benghazi, but after analyzing the situation, we knew we could not hold Benghazi. Even if the Axis did not take Benghazi, stationing troops there would weaken us against attacks elsewhere. So I had to take a stand. Our initial defensive focus was to defend Tobruk, and defend any major roadways to Egypt. We had to slow down the German advance enough, so that we can defend Tobruk, while buying enough time to get our reinforcements in. I stationed most of my other non-Tobruk divisions near Tobruk near the important intersection of El Gubi, and the intersection at Bir Harmat. In addition to helping clog the roadways, these troops also defend our Supply lines, and defend Tobruk from an all out siege. In order to defend the southernmost route, I had to order a mechanized infrantry division to hold the Jalo Oasis. This would delay any southern advance through the southern desert. In addition, this would threaten the supply routes of the Axis and force the Axis to allocate resources to defend this area. Maybe the Axis would have to expend valuable supply to deal with the threat on the Jalo Oasis.INTERVIEWER: So what transpired during January 1941?GENERAL: The Axis did advance very quickly eastwards towards Tobruk with most of their forces. In order to secure their supply lines, the Axis took a two pronged advance -- some units took the Coast Road and some units took the Track near Mechili. The Axis appear to have their Italian Infrantry move with the German Panzer Divisions. Later in the month, after the Axis rapid advance, they launch attacks against the our troops at Bir Harmat and El Gubi. The Axis troops were more powerful than the troops at the time. I knew we could not hold. The Germans and Italians would just be sending more and more troops, and our troops would be defeated. The Germans could use their excellent mobility by outflanking us and cutting of our supply lines. We could not hold, so I ordered retreats. Our units took casualties, but we were buying valuable time. I was told that reinforcements would be coming, and that I just needed to buy time. In the southern part of the Libyan Desert, the Axis had to allocate a mechanized infantry division (due to some mixup at the German command, or probably because of an error by a German logistics officer) and a panzer tank division to defeat the unit at the Jalo Oasis. While I am saddened to report that there were many casualties and prisoners of war taken there, I would say that all of them fought valiantly, and the free world thanks them for their valor and their sacrifice. Next Month ContinuedBack to RitD Home |