Rommel In The Desert, Campaign 1941

Month 1, 1941


April 1941 (Month 1)

Start of month

INTERVIEWER:
	General, thank you very much for joining us today.

GENERAL:
	Thank you for giving me this opportunity to talk to you.

INTERVIEWER:
	It's 1941.  The Allies have ordered many of your divisions out of
	the North African theatre, weakening your position.  You do hold
	the vital forward supply base at Tobruk, and you stationed
	many Australian, Indian, and British troops to protect the garrison.
	However, your intelligence tells you that German General Erwin Rommel
	has been assigned to the area.  He appears to have under his control
	many Italian foot infantry, and also, several strong mobile Panzer 
	divisions.   What are your thoughts at this point?

GENERAL:
	Yes, based on our intelligence, the Allies did have more powerful
	and mobile tanks than we do.  The vast Libyan desert is open
	to the Germans, and they did pose a dangerous risk by outflanking
	us and cutting off our supply lines.  Certainly, we had to defend
	the important forward supply base at Tobruk.  I stationed the valiant 
	Australians, British and Indian troops therre to defend that base.
	However, with the few remaining divisions I had available, I had to
	defend the vast Libyan Desert.  We had control of Benghazi, but
	after analyzing the situation, we knew we could not hold Benghazi.
	Even if the Axis did not take Benghazi, stationing troops there
	would weaken us against attacks elsewhere.  So I had to take 
	a stand.  Our initial defensive focus was to defend Tobruk, and
	defend any major roadways to Egypt.  We had to slow down the
	German advance enough, so that we can defend Tobruk, while buying 
	enough time to get our reinforcements in. 

	I stationed most of my other non-Tobruk divisions near Tobruk
	near the important intersection of El Gubi, and the intersection
	at Bir Harmat.  In addition to helping clog the roadways, these troops
	also defend our Supply lines, and defend Tobruk from an all out siege.

	In order to defend the southernmost route, I had to order a 
	mechanized infrantry division to hold the Jalo Oasis.  This would
	delay any southern advance through the southern desert.  In addition,
	this would threaten the supply routes of the Axis and force the
	Axis to allocate resources to defend this area.  Maybe the Axis would
	have to expend valuable supply to deal with the threat on the 
	Jalo Oasis.
INTERVIEWER:
	So what transpired during January 1941?
GENERAL:
	The Axis did advance very quickly eastwards towards Tobruk with
	most of their forces.  In order to secure their supply lines,
	the Axis took a two pronged advance -- some units took the Coast Road
	and some units took the Track near Mechili.   The Axis appear to
	have their Italian Infrantry move with the German Panzer Divisions.

	Later in the month, after the Axis rapid advance, they launch attacks 
	against the our troops at Bir Harmat and El Gubi.  The Axis troops
	were more powerful than the troops at the time.  I knew we could
	not hold.  The Germans and Italians would just be sending more 
	and more troops, and our troops would be defeated.  The Germans
	could use their excellent mobility by outflanking us and cutting
	of our supply lines.  We could not hold, so I ordered retreats.
	Our units took casualties, but we were buying valuable time.
	I was told that reinforcements would be coming, and that I just
	needed to buy time.  

	In the southern part of the Libyan Desert, the Axis had to
	allocate a mechanized infantry division (due to some mixup
	at the German command, or probably because of an error
	by a German logistics officer) and a panzer tank division to
	defeat the unit at the Jalo Oasis.  While I am saddened
	to report that there were many casualties and prisoners of war
	taken there, I would say that all of them fought valiantly,
	and the free world thanks them for their valor and their sacrifice.

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